

DISPATCH

Approved For Release 2007/07/25 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000100100022-9

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Director, OSA (Attn: [REDACTED])	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Base [REDACTED]	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	Specific: Comments on Manpower Survey Report	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES Ref: IDEA 0032-69

1. In general, we find the report to be thorough and acceptable in its remarks, conclusions, and recommendations. However, there are several points on which we wish to comment. Most often these will represent considered judgements made since the visit by the survey team and in some cases on data or experiences that did not exist at that time.

2. The following comments are keyed to pages and paragraphs in IDEA 0032-69:

a. Page 5, Para F. The opening statement does not appear to be a safe one at this time. With extensive runway, hangar, and other modifications planned by the Detachment and by the Base C question that our construction program is "essential. Recent comments from the Base Engineering Office of all World War II buildings at [REDACTED] are program replacement. Thus, all hangars at North Base would be replaced. We anticipate additional new projects and the resultant construction of support facilities. These and [REDACTED] seen projects would dictate retention of the "Maintenance" slot of the Director of Support.

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It should be noted that the Director of Support administers the Personnel, Budget and Finance, Communications Sections, and Vehicle Maintenance Section and has general duties (cafeteria, building and grounds, etc.) as normally assigned any Support Officer. The time available for him to follow-up in detail each bit of engineering and maintenance work both at Main Base and "on-the-job" is limited. The two maintenance people on contract are an electrician and a carpenter; while excellent at their trades, they cannot work daily at the [REDACTED] and also represent the Support Officer before the Base Civil Engineer at the supervisory level. In summary, we feel that a full time maintenance officer is required to handle the routines and improvements for an operating facility the size of North Base in support of [REDACTED] men and 25X1: diverse activities of the squadron.

b. Page 5, Para G. We see no indication of a slackening-off of work within the Detachment. We note the change in the Detachment's mission to that of a "single staging" capability as mentioned in this paragraph; and several other places in the report. In retrospect, an extreme effort would have been required to achieve a dual staging if ordered prior to

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UCLT-1524	18 March 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	
	ORIGINATING	
	OFFICE	OFFICER
	TYPIST	
	EXT.	
	COORDINATING	
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
	OFFICER'S NAME	
RELEASING		
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE		
18 Mar 69		

this mission change. It was well recognized that a second deployment would have entailed almost a complete shut-down of activities at North Base. This would have included most training and development of the U-2R, and operational flights for improvements of [] and camera syst^{25X1}. As these later type operations consume almost as much effort as the capability for a second deployment team, there is then no significant^{25X1} indication of a decrease in requirements for operational support. In^{25X1} fact, we find the actual requirements curve continuing to spiral upward as more diverse tasks are received under projects [] Red Dot, LOX System trials, etc., and we now know of several new [] appearing on the horizon; these will require extensive flight tests.

c. The suggestion that Operations Officers could possibly fulfil^{25X1} flying requirements now flown by "drivers" is subject to critical examination. The purpose in reducing the number of "drivers" to [] was two-fold: (1) Money saving, and (2) Lack of flying time available. First, the cost of qualifying a driver includes about \$16,000 for a pressure suit, plus seventy (70) hours of flying training at \$2,000 plus per hour. The total cost of qualification becomes \$140,000.00 plus. Also, as any Operations Officer will have a number of other duties aside from that of pilot, it may appear uneconomical to invest the amount of money required for qualification for a pilot who would be available for less than full-time as a U-2 "driver".

We do not agree that the LSO could not fulfill the Operations Officers requirements for a Detachment engaged in carrier training operations. We believe he should be well suited and qualified for this assignment. Further, one Operations Officer goes on deployment with the primary duty to assist the Mission Commander; when an Operations Officer is the Mission Commander he would then require an additional Operations Officer to assist him.

d. Page 18, Para B. There are only two NCOs assigned to the command post. One is a clerk typist and the other a form five (5) clerk.

e. Page 6, Para I. The matter of "flyable storage" for U-2C/G aircraft is not firmly settled. Current opinions are that the "C" model will still be active requiring dual qualification of drivers and a duplication of pressure suits and some other personal equipment. For as long as drivers must be dual qualified, there will be little reduction possible in the effort and manpower required in the P.E. area.

f. Pages 8 and 9. These recommendations should be reviewed and revised as appropriate in line with the foregoing.

g. Page 31, Para A. The size of this effort by QC&E personnel will not decrease its importance. We are now attempting to evaluate the current and future needs and devise a means of staffing for their responsibilities. It appears that a senior full-time inspector on U-2 C/G maintenance and U-3 and T-33 support aircraft with no other outside duties, is a logical solution.

h. Page 35, Para E. One T-35 technician is not sufficient to support Detachment training, testing, and deployment requirements. Two would provide marginal reliability and the statement that "high reliability and performance of this equipment indicates this manning posture as being too high", cannot be taken at face value. The reliability and performance may, in fact, be the result of a consistently high level of maintenance - even now the equipment is not trouble-free. Further, we would, with a T/O of two at [] need a third person designated by the contractor as available at the plant to replace the squadron assignee should he be unable to report for work or be on deployment.

i. Page 37, Para C. A misunderstanding has occurred in this area. The other maintenance tech is [] who is principally ^{25X1} occupied with electrical maintenance. The machine shop is supervised and operated by a machinist.

j. Page 41, Para B 1. We do not concur with this recommendation. The action would add to our T/O; this is contrary to current policy.

The determination of equivalent pay would present a problem in terms of allowances and benefits. Further, subject would be expecting reassignment at the end of a tour of two to four years; the value of the current assignment is that it is considered permanent and provides continuity and depth of experience. We raise the question, "Is this change necessary?"

3. The visit and exchange of ideas of the Manpower Survey Team were most beneficial to all of us. If can furnish further information and/or data to substantiate our position, please feel free to call upon us.

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